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Redefining the Issues in Fetal Experimentation· 
Eugene F. Diamond, M.D. 
Doctor Diamond, a member of 
the department of pediatrics at 
Loyola University's Stritch School 
of Medicine, is also an associate 
editor of Linacre Quarterly. 
There has been a crisis of pub-
lic confidence (Marriage and 
Family Newsletter, January 
1972, pp. 1-8) in the medical 
profession generated in this 
country by the performance of 
vivisection-type experiments on 
live aborted fetuses 1 and highly 
questionable therapeutic trials in-
volving institutionalized mentally 
defective children.2,3 Very few 
investigators and a small number 
of studies are involved. Measures 
to prevent a recurrence of abuses 
are appropriate, but the response 
of the medical profession to at-
tempts to establish guidelines has 
been hyperbolic, and overblown, 
and inconsistent with the profes-
sion's crucial responsibility to 
patient advocacy. 
The issue has never been 
whether research would be con-
ducted but how it would be con-
ducted. Research is not necessar-
ily deterred by restrictive guide-
lines. It is quite possible that re-
search as a whole would be ad-
vanced if the public were reas-
s ured that no further abuses 
would be tolerated (News & 
Comment 25:8,1974). 
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Much of what has been indig-
nantly defended in the medical 
literature as "essential to prog-
ress" was never at issue in the de-
bate. Responsible opponents of 
inappropriate fetal experimenta-
tion have not opposed the taking 
of fetal blood samples in 
amounts that were not exsan-
guinating or a threat to circula-
tory function. Similarly, the as-
piration of amniotic fluid speci-
mens, the majority of which 
would be done for therapeutic 
indications, would not be pre-
cluded by most state laws as pro-
posed . The proposed Illinois law 
would specifically exempt pro-
cedures done to establish cell-
culture lines, providing that these 
procedures were not, of them-
selves, life-threatening (HB-2211 
78th General Assembly, State of 
Illinois). Almost all guidelines 
specifically indicate that experi-
ments done to promote the 
health or preserve the life of the 
experimental subject were not to 
be forbidden. 
Questions of Consent 
The systematic performance 
of abortions in order to make 
*Reprinted with permission from 
The Journal of the American Medical 
Association, July 19, 1976, Vol. 236, 
No. 3, pp. 281-283 . Copyright 1976, 
American Medical Association. 
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fetal donor organs available for 
transplantation would not be tol-
erated (J Religious Ethics 2 :33, 
1974). However, the occasional 
use of fetal organs, such as the 
thym us, for transplantation 
would not be routinely opposed, 
providing that the aborted infant 
were dead, using the same criter-
ia for death determination that 
would be applied to an adult 
donor. One need not approve of 
abortion in order to allow the 
disposal of the tissues of the 
child who is dead as a result of 
abortion. One need not approve 
of murder in order to allow the 
murder victim's body to be au-
topsied or his organs to be do-
nated (Natl Right to Life News, 
September 1974, pp. 10-11). Cri-
teria such as those of the Ad Hoc 
Committee of the Harvard Medi-
cal School4 could be used to es-
tablish that the aborted child 
was, in fact, dead before organs 
were removed for transplant. 
Likewise , the criteria of the Uni-
form Anatomical Gift Act could 
be applied to the use of body 
parts of deceased infants, subject 
to the approval of next of kin. 
Whereas next of kin might 
reasonably qualify to grant au-
topsy permission, there is serious 
question as to whether the 
mother who has consented to 
abortion would qualify to give 
permission for non beneficial re-
search on her aborted child. If 
the decision to abort is accepted 
as a resolution of a conflict be-
tween the rights of the mother 
and the rights of the child, then 
it must be admitted that the 
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mother who chooses abortion 
has demonstrated her willingness 
to prefer her rights to those of 
the child. This would be the case 
in all instances except the very 
rare situation where no abortion 
means death for both the mother 
and fetus. Arguments that are 
proposed under the rubric of the 
"woman's right to her body" 
usually unscientifically and er-
roneously define the fetus as a 
part of the woman's body rather 
than a resident in the woman's 
body. In either event, no such 
claim can be made by the woman 
for control over an infant placed 
outside of the woman's body by 
an abortion procedure. 
In hearings before the Health 
Subcommittee on the subject of 
fetal experimentation, Senator 
Edward Kennedy suggested 5 
that it would be hard to justify 
to reasonable men and women 
the proposition that the mother 
of an aborted infant had "the in-
terest, love, and concern for the 
patient foremost in her mind 
when she gives consent to exper-
imentation on her live aborted 
offspring." Parents who give 
proxy consent to experimenta-
tion on their children are usually 
accepted as having such affec-
tional bonds to the child outside 
of the context of abortion, but 
the assumption of such loving in-
terest is highly questionable 
w hen experimentation on 
aborted subjects is at issue. 
This is of particular impor-
tance when the experiment pro-
posed is non therapeutic in na-
ture. It is, in fact, currently a 
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moot issue to be decided by the 
courts. (Nielson vs Regents of 
the University of California, et 
al) as to whether any parents 
may ever give consent to nonben-
eficial research on a child. The 
aforementioned court decision 
may resolve the issue, but in the 
meanwhile, we may rely on a tra-
dition traceable to English com-
mon law that a parent may not 
consent to anything that injures 
his child.6 This tradition is the 
basis for all child-abuse laws. No 
one may sign a permit for an il-
legal act on another person, even 
if that person is his own "minor 
dependent child . A parent may 
require his own child's services 
but may not sell his child into in-
voluntary servitude to another 
outside the family. The decision 
as to what constitutes legal 
proxy consent to nontherapeutic 
experimentation is likely to re-
main with the courts irrespective 
of any medical body's decision. 
Questions of Viability 
The World Health Organiza-
tion defines a live birth as the de-
livery of a neonate with a heart-
beat, a pulsating cord, a muscular 
movement, or a respiratory ef-
fort. A crucial difference be-
tween the opposing camps in the 
fetal experimentation debate re-
volves around the right to protec-
tion of the live-born product of 
an induced abortion. One camp 
concentrates on the fact that the 
infant is, in fact, now alive. The 
other camp concentrates on the 
fact that he is nonviable by prog-
nosis. Opposition to non thera-
peutic experimentation on such 
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an infant is based on the prin-
ciple that no experiment can be 
justified merely on the basis of 
the fact that the patien t suffers 
from a uniformly fatal disease 
with a short life expectancy. This 
rule would have as much validity 
if the abortion had been spontan-
eous rather than induced. 
It would be preferable to sep-
arate the issues of fetal experi-
mentation from the emotionally 
charged issue of abortion. The 
Supreme Court decision of Jan. 
22 , 1973, while it has called into 
question the rights of the pre-
viable fetus in utero, has not 
affected the rights of any live-
born infant once he is outside 
the womb. Some investigators, 
however, seem to have inferred 
otherwise and have specifically 
referred to the aforesaid abortion 
decision as a justification for ex-
perimentation. The Society for 
Developmental Biology, for ex-
ample, has stated in a unani-
mously approved resolution that 
it "supports the continued use of 
human tissues at all states of de-
velopment, embryonic and fetal, 
within the framework of the Doe 
vs. Bolton ruling of the U.S. 
Supreme Court" (Pediatric News, 
September 1975, p . 5). John 
Opitz, MD, at the Annual Na-
tional Foundation Birth Defects 
Conference, is quoted as follows: 
"The Supreme Court decision on 
abortion defined the right of 
every citizen to make an in-
formed decision on abortion . 
This right must not be abridged 
by restrictions on fetal research" 
(Pediatric News, September 
Linacre Quarterly 
1974, p. 7). It would seem that 
it is the proabortionists, not the 
anti-abortionists, who have con-
fused the issues of abortion and 
experimentation. A careful read-
ing of Roe us Wade and Doe us 
Bolton would support the notion 
that its principles cease to apply 
once the mother is separated 
from her offspring. The Supreme 
Court was reluctant to confer 
"personhood" prior to birth, but 
it is difficult to see how it could 
avoid conferring personhood on 
a living, albeit previable, infant. 
Surely the infant cannot be con-
strued as a part of the mother, 
with its rights in conflict with 
hers, if the mother is in a recov-
ery room and the infant is in an 
incubator in the nursery. 
Extrinsic vs Intrinsic Value 
As in the abortion debate, 
there has been an unfortunate 
attempt to inject religious issues 
into the debate by absurd slogans 
such as "Know-Nothingism" 
(Hospital Practice 9:11, 1974) or 
dark references to the Galileo 
trial or the Scopes case.7 The 
medical profession, in consigning 
the protesters to the peculiar 
isolation of a lunatic fringe, does 
so at the peril of its own political 
credibility. The entire spectrum 
of the society is very literally in-
volved in this debate. The orig-
inal protests against the Willow-
brook experiments originated on 
one end of the political spectrum 
from the Student Health Organi-
zation at Mount Sinai (Contra-
indications 2:1-4, 1974) and the 
original protests against fetal ex-
perimentation orginated from a 
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small band of high-school pro-
testers from a convent school in 
Maryland (Pediatric News, May 
1973, p. 1) on the other end of 
the spectrum. The issues are non-
sectarian, but they do contrast 
two philosophical positions. One 
position would assert a transcen-
dental view of human life at all 
stages of life's continuum, em-
bryonic, fetal, child, adult. Life 
at all stages, in this view, has an 
intrinsic and unquantifiable 
value. This value transcends the 
real or alleged values of experi-
mentation and research. If a 
human being is deformed, dying 
of a fatal disease, or previable, 
the ontological goodness of his 
being is still intact. 
The other position would con-
sign to human beings values that 
are extrinsic . Each human life is 
not an end in and of itself, but 
rather a means to another end, 
which is the good society. Ex-
trinsic value is not a per se condi-
tion of life, and some are said to 
lack it.8 From the totalitarian 
view that the individual exists for 
the society, one can conclude 
that experiments can be per-
formed on a member of this gen-
eration in order to assist mem-
bers of future generations. A 
small injustice to this previable 
infant may result in great bene-
fits to mankind. An experiment 
performed on a pregnant woman 
scheduled for abortion may help 
a "wanted" child to have a better 
chance of survival. Lives which 
grossly lack "quality" (e .g., 
trisomy 21) should be termin-
ated early for their own and so-
ciety's good. 9 
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As Rabbi Immanuel Jakobo-
vits10 has pointed out, however, 
if one life is construed as having 
infinite value, then one life is as 
valuable as many lives, and any 
small fraction of a life has infi-
nite value because any fraction 
of infinity is still infinite. 
Fetus ex Utero vs Infant 
How can these two conflicting 
views be reconciled in order to 
establish guidelines acceptable to 
both philosophies? One essential 
first step is to treat the live-born 
previable child delivered by abor-
tion the same as any other sub-
ject for human experimentation. 
The proposed policy of the De-
partment of Health, Education, 
and Welfare ll on Protection of 
Human Subjects displays some 
reluctance to do this. 
For example, the commission 
lists four principles that it de-
scribes as "among the general 
principles for research judged to 
be valid and binding." The sec-
ond of these four principles (re-
ferred to as the "principle of 
equality") is as follows: "To pro-
vide for fair treatment by avoid-
ing discrimination between class-
es or among members of the 
same class." Commenting on this 
principle of equality, the com-
mission anticipates that "differ-
ences of interpretation will arise 
over the application of the basic 
principles of equality and the de-
termination of minimal risk." 
The report explains, "Some 
members held that no procedures 
should be applied to a fetus to be 
aborted that would not be ap-
plied to a fetus going to term." 
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This proposal was rejected, how-
ever, and the protection afforded 
the not-to-be-aborted fetus in 
recommendation 4 is effectively 
removed from the fetus in antici-
pation of abortion in recommen-
dation 5 by the proviso that a 
"national ethical review body" 
might allow nontherapeutic ex-
periments of greater-than-min-
imal risk to the fetus to be 
aborted. Louisell,2 in his minor-
ity report, recommends that this 
provision be eliminated in favor 
of a declaration that "no re-
search should be permitted on a 
fetus to be aborted that could 
not be permitted on one to go to 
term." 
Likewise, in its recommenda-
tion 6, the commission provides 
for the possibility that, with ma-
ternal approval and lack of pater-
nal objection, certain infants up 
to five months gestational age 
might be submitted to non thera-
peutic research not possible on 
other live human beings, provid-
ing again that a "national ethical 
review body" approves. Interest-
ingly, such a subject for experi-
mentation is described as a "non-
viable fetus ex-utero." Tradition-
ally, medicine, law, and the so-
ciety in general have used the 
term "human infant" to describe 
a live birth regardless of its 
degree of prematurity. In its rec-
ommendation 7, the commission 
itself refers to the "possible 
viable infant" rather than the 
"possible viable fetus ex-utero" 
and then proceeds to accord to 
this "infant" protections not ac-
corded to the class described as 
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"fetuses ex-utero" by the elimin-
ation of the "review body" es-
cape clause. Since "fetus" is a 
word used to describe a stage of 
intrauterine life, "fetus ex-utero" 
is probably a contradiciton in 
terms that, one may reasonably 
suspect, was chosen to reflect an 
unwillingness to humanize the 
previable infant (particularly 
when it was born as a result of 
induced abortion). The sophisti-
cated classification used by the 
commission is very helpful in 
structuring the discussion. It 
must not be accepted as a means 
for defining some human beings 
out of existence, however, nor a 
means to divert our attention 
from what our experiment pro-
poses to do and onto the nature 
of the experimental subject. 
Once the "non-viable fetus 
ex-utero" is treated as a small hu-
man being while alive, many of 
the difficulties are reconciled. 
Guidelines based on this pre-
sumption can be developed, or 
the traditional guidelines of the 
Declaration of Helsinki or the 
Nuremberg Code can be applied 
to the model of research on the 
so-called "abortus." Article III-1 
of the Declaration of Helsinki 
states : "In the purely scientific 
application of clinical research 
carried out on a human being, it 
is the duty of the doctor to re-
main the protector of the life 
and health of that person on 
whom clinical research is being 
carried out." This article would 
clearly preclude such experi-
ments as those in which live-born 
fetuses were decapitated in order 
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that their heads could be per-
fused to study carbohydrate me-
tabolism .1 Articles 1-3, 11I-3b, 
and III-4b would also be germane 
to the types of newborn experi-
ments that have brought criti-
cism (Marriage and Family News-
letter, January 1972, pp. 1-8). 
Logical Inconsistencies 
There are those who suggest 
that there is no way to under-
stand the problems unique to 
prenatal and neonatal life with-
out using experimental subjects 
during these particular stages. 
The same could be said of dis-
eases peculiar to the geriatric age 
group or adolescence or any 
other age-specific disease process. 
This may not be used as a justifi-
cation for suspending the rules 
on nontherapeutic experimenta-
tion or for settling down age-
specific rules for obtaining con-
sent (Medical World News, Octo-
ber 1973, pp. 32-36). Likewise, 
the limitations in translating ani-
mal data to human application 
are equally applicable to research 
done on human beings at all ages. 
In point of fact, progeny studies 
done on animal species have been 
successful in many instances in 
predicting adverse human effects 
of drugs. In the case of thal-
idomide, research done on al-
most every species of animal has 
demonstrated the production of 
limb-bud anomalies directly com-
parable to those produced in hu-
man subjects (Medical Tribune 
72:3,1966). 
If the patterns of funding by 
the National Institutes of Health 
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are to be used as an indication, 
the performance of nonthera-
peutic experimentation on 
fetuses in utero and live-born 
aborted infants make up only a 
fractional part of the total of 
perinatal research. The unethical 
use of aborted experimental sub-
jects is attributable to an infini-
tesimal percentage of researchers 
in this field. The establishment 
of reasonable controls over fetal 
experimentation need not pose a 
threat either to medical progress 
or to the responsible investigator. 
Nonproprietary Name 
and Trademark of Drug 
Thalidomide - Kevadon. 
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